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Abstract
Recent studies identify a robust positive correlation between the productivity of urban
workers and the presence of a diverse range of immigrants in their midst. Seeking to
better understand this relationship, this paper tests the hypothesis that the rewards
from immigrant diversity will be higher in metropolitan areas that feature more “in-
clusive” social and economic institutions. Institutions ought to matter because they
regulate transaction costs, which in principle determine whether or not diversity offers
advantages or disadvantages. We exploit longitudinal linked employer-employee data
for the U.S. to test this idea, and triangulate across two measures that differently cap-
ture the inclusiveness of urban institutions. Findings offer support for the hypothesis.
In cities with low levels of inclusive institutions, the benefits of diversity are modest
and in some cases nonexistent; in cities with high levels of inclusive institutions, the
benefits of immigrant diversity are positive, significant, and substantial. We also find
that weakly inclusive institutions hurt natives considerably more than foreign-born
workers. These results confirm the economic significance of immigrant diversity, while
suggesting the importance of local social and economic institutions.
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1 Introduction
The United States is home to one in five international migrants (Özden et al., 2011), and
these individuals disproportionately reside in metropolitan areas (Wilson and Svajlenka,
2014). City-regions like New York, Los Angeles, and Miami lie at the extreme of the
resulting immigrant diversity, with approximately one in three residents born abroad,1 and
with scores of sending countries represented among the foreign born population (Ruggles
et al., 2010, authors’ calculations). Birthplace heterogeneity is also present and growing
among smaller and less obviously cosmopolitan cities. For instance, one elementary school
in the Buffalo-Niagara Falls metropolitan area – the 50th largest urban region in the
country, and the location of one of this study’s authors – reports that its students were
born in more than 70 different countries.2
The economic implications of this diversity are the focus of a growing body of research,
seeking to better understand its impacts on work and urban quality-of-life. Studies of the
former topic, like the present one, are chiefly motivated by theory predicting that hetero-
geneity, defined broadly, should either enhance or impair worker productivity. Theorists
of complex systems (Page, 2008); organizations (Huberman, 1990); and cities (Jacobs,
1969) assert that interactions among agents with distinctive heuristics and perspectives
can improve problem solving and stimulate innovation. Psychologists identify additional
dimensions to this relationship, suggesting that agents in diverse groups can find it difficult
to establish common ground (Tajfel, 1974; Turner et al., 1987). Absent shared perspec-
tives, agents face higher transaction costs, and are more likely to engage in rent-seeking
behavior, which stands to reduce economic performance (Van Knippenberg and Schippers,
2007). Synthesizing these ideas, a model emerges in which diversity implies latent eco-
nomic advantages and disadvantages whose realization depends on the cost of interaction
(Kemeny, 2014).
The purpose of this paper is to test this model. If the model captures the under-
lying mechanisms at work, the effects of urban immigrant diversity on productivity will
depend on institutions, defined as “the humanly devised constraints that structure po-
1U.S. Census Bureau, 2010-2014 American Community Survey 5-Year Estimates, “Selected Character-
istics of the Native and Foreign-Born Populations” available from the American FactFinder website. The
population of the Miami metro area is nearly 40% foreign-born (authors’ calculations).
2Buffalo PS 45 International School: http://www.buffaloschools.org/InternationalSchool45.cfm
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litical, economic and social interaction.” (North, 1991, p.97). More specifically, we test
the hypothesis that the benefits of diversity ought to be larger in regions where institu-
tions are “inclusive” (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012), meaning that they lower the costs
of interaction in a society consisting of different groups. With few exceptions, existing
empirical studies at the urban scale have not measured such institutions, instead testing
more generally for the existence and direction of spillovers from diversity. These studies
mostly conclude that diversity and productivity are robustly positively related, leading re-
searchers to suggest that immigrant diversity in cities generates tangible economic benefits
(Ottaviano and Peri, 2006; Nathan, 2011; Bellini et al., 2013; Suedekum et al., 2014; Trax
et al., 2015; Kemeny and Cooke, 2015; Elias and Paradies, 2016). Hence, one reason to
examine the moderating role of institutions is that it provides the opportunity to estimate
a model of diversity’s economic impacts that is, compared to much of the extant empirical
work, closer to theory.
The present paper also extends the work of two extant studies that do consider the
connections between institutions, diversity, and economic outcomes at a subnational scale:
Alesina and La Ferrara (2005), and Kemeny (2012). It does so in three main ways. First,
it offers new and improved measures of local institutions, triangulating across these in
order to have more confidence that they capture the underlying latent variable of interest.
Second, in keeping with recent contributions in the literature, notably Bakens et al. (2013),
Trax et al. (2015), Kemeny and Cooke (2015), and Elias and Paradies (2016), it uses an
empirical approach that accounts for a wide range of potential confounding factors. Third,
it unpacks overall estimates to consider how institutions and diversity operate differently
for natives and foreign-born workers. With these advantages, estimates in this paper
should provide stronger evidence on the role of diversity in shaping worker productivity,
and on the role of institutions in this relationship.
We exploit variation over both time and space to identify the context-specific effects
of diversity on productivity. Leveraging the time dimension, we estimate how workers’
wages (our proxy for productivity) respond to annual changes in the diversity present in
their city, and also in their workplace. Differences in cities’ institutional context allow us
to consider how the relationship between wages and diversity vary across workers in more
and less inclusive cities. We limit attention to job ‘spells’ in which individual workers
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remain in a single workplace and city for at least two years. This permits the estimation
of fixed effects models whose chief virtue is their ability to absorb bias from stationary
unobserved heterogeneity at multiple scales, and in so doing address concerns of bias
from sorting and other selectivity issues present in earlier work (Kemeny, 2014; Lewis and
Peri, 2014; Combes et al., 2008). Additionally, we use the two-step generalized method of
moments (GMM) fixed effects estimator with lagged internal instruments to help account
for remaining endogeneity issues.
We draw on data from various sources to accomplish these tasks. Information about
workers and workplaces comes from a version of the U.S. Census Bureau’s confidential Lon-
gitudinal Employer-Household Dynamics (LEHD), a matched employer-employee dataset
for the U.S. covering nearly all employees in 29 states on a quarterly basis between 1991
and 2008. Our first measure of inclusive institutions captures metropolitan-specific mani-
festations of bonding and bridging forms of social capital. The second describes pro- and
anti-immigrant ordinances enacted by local governments. In distinctive ways, each sheds
light on the opportunities for city residents to interact and residents’ attitudes regarding
those who differ from them, with the ordinance measure more specifically capturing a
formalization of residents’ attitudes about the presence of immigrants in their locality.
Across our two very different measures of institutions we find consistent evidence in
support of our hypothesis. Workers living and working in cities featuring weakly inclusive
institutions receive only modest, and in some cases statistically insignificant wage gains
in association with the rising diversity in their cities. Meanwhile worker productivity
in cities with inclusive institutions responds sharply to shifts in metropolitan immigrant
diversity. In short, the inclusiveness of local institutions strongly moderates the realized
economic value of immigrant diversity. Exploring disparate impacts by nativity, we find
that natives in cities that have enacted anti-immigrant ordinances receive no diversity
bonus, while productivity among immigrant workers in such cities remains positively linked
to diversity, albeit less strongly than for workers in more inclusive locations.
The remainder of the article is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews relevant lit-
erature on the local economics of immigrant diversity and institutions. Sections 3 and 4
describe the empirical approach taken in this paper, and the data used. Section 5 presents
results. Section 6 concludes.
3
2 Diversity, Productivity and Institutions: The Literature
Suppose that interactions among members of a heterogeneous population contain the po-
tential to generate both economic advantages and disadvantages. But interaction varies
in its costliness, and, all else equal, transactions among individuals who share a common
background are less costly than transactions among individuals without such commonali-
ties. It follows that both rewards and costs are higher when interacting with people who
are different.
These ideas have been explored by a wide array of social scientists. Psychologists, as
well as scholars of organizations and other complex systems assert that behind people’s
demographic characteristics lie deeply rooted differences in heuristics and perspectives
(Nisbett et al., 1980; Clearwater et al., 1991; Thomas and Ely, 1996; Page, 2008). Heuristic
diversity can improve problem solving by creating a wider map of possible solutions (Hong
and Page, 2001, 2004), as well as by fostering the cross-pollination of ideas, leading to
novelty (Aiken and Hage, 1971). This enhanced capacity for problem solving ought to
manifest itself in higher productivity. On the other hand, psychology’s ‘social identity
theory’ considers that populations composed of heuristically heterogeneous agents will find
it harder to achieve trust and to generate shared understanding. Immediate consequences
are that it will be more costly for workers to cooperate, and rent-seeking behavior will be
more prevalent (Byrne, 1971; Harrison and Klein, 2007), which should inhibit productivity
(Turner et al., 1987; Chatman and Flynn, 2001). This prediction has been borne out in
relation to economic growth in ethnically-fractionalized developing countries (Alesina and
Drazen, 1991; Easterly and Levine, 1997; Alesina and La Ferrara, 2005; Montalvo and
Reynal-Querol, 2005).
Over the last decade, economic geographers and regional scientists have begun con-
sidering the impacts of diversity at the metropolitan scale, focusing mainly on immigrant
diversity. The emergence of this agenda can be rationalized in a few ways. First, though
immigrant or birthplace diversity is just one among many potential sources of heuristic
heterogeneity, urban immigrant diversity has expanded considerably in recent years in a
wide range of economies, and touches on a topic of perennial academic and popular signifi-
cance. Second, influential urbanists like Jacobs (1969) and Bairoch (1991) offer celebratory
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accounts of the economic virtues of various forms of diversity, analogously premised on the
benefits associated with the city’s capacity to act as an intellectual petri-dish. And most
specifically, economic geography is premised on the idea that crucial economic interactions
– especially those for which there is a central role for creativity and complex problem solv-
ing – cohere at a scale that is external to individual teams and firms but internal to
metropolitan areas (e.g., Audretsch and Feldman, 2004; Moretti, 2012; Fujita and Thisse,
2013; Storper, 2013). According to this logic, interactions among a demographically –
and therefore heuristically – diverse urban populace ought to enhance problem solving,
creativity and innovation. Hence, cities that are more immigrant-diverse ought to have
higher productivity, as long as the negative externalities associated with diversity do not
overwhelm the benefits.
Scholars have sought to measure the existence of spillovers from immigrant diversity
in cities, considering impacts on productivity, innovation, and entrepreneurship.3 Though
results vary by country and approach taken, a wealth of studies find evidence consistent
with the idea that immigrant diversity augments worker and firm productivity (Ottaviano
and Peri, 2006; Bellini et al., 2013; Bakens et al., 2013; Suedekum et al., 2014; Kemeny,
2012; Nathan, 2011; Longhi, 2013; Alesina et al., 2013; Lee, 2014; Nathan, 2015). Recent
contributions have sought to address bias from confounding factors, including non-random
worker selectivity, or sorting (Bakens et al., 2013; Kemeny and Cooke, 2015; Trax et al.,
2015; Elias and Paradies, 2016). In the case of Trax et al. (2015) for Germany, and Kemeny
and Cooke (2015) for the U.S., the positive association between urban immigrant diversity
and productivity remains after accounting for sorting behavior, diversity in the workplace,
and other sources of heterogeneity at the individual, workplace and city scales.
Despite this growing econometric sophistication, few studies to date account for vari-
ation in the cost of interpersonal interaction. The theory above suggests that the cost of
interaction will determine the extent of realized economic advantages or disadvantages.
When interactions can be cheaply conducted, trust and cooperation should facilitate the
realization of the kinds of benefits that are latent in diversity. When interactions across in-
dividuals born in different countries can only be conducted at a high cost, both the number
of quality of such interactions ought to be reduced, resulting in diminished productivity.
3For recent reviews of this literature, see Kemeny (2014) and Nathan (2014).
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It should be expected that some component of these costs are idiosyncratic – internal
to individuals, based on their preferences and background (e.g., Valentine and Sadgrove,
2014). Workplaces and firms also plausibly generate their own regularities around such
costs. But, as historians, economists, and other social scientists have argued for decades,
there are systematic factors above such scales that shape the costliness of interaction.
Most famously, North (1991) argues that, in an economy involving a complex division of
labor, significant territory, and agents who are not tied by kinship, the market requires
coordination to overcome problems of agency and enforcement. Institutions are the system
of formal and informal rules and norms facilitating this coordination, strengthening trust
and reducing defection so as to enable interactions among a diverse and specialized pop-
ulation. Echoing this theme, Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) argue for the importance of
“inclusive” institutions, especially as economies approach the technological frontier. For-
mal and informal institutions are inclusive when, in Robinson’s words, they “create the
incentives and opportunities necessary to harness the energy, creativity and entrepreneur-
ship in society” (2013, p.1).
Applied more narrowly to issues of heterogeneity, this suggests that inclusive institu-
tions should be those that reduce the costs that people born in different countries face
in interacting with each other. When such institutions are present, they should minimize
the disadvantages associated with cross-cultural interaction, and better enable the real-
ization of benefits. This moderating role for institutions is more than intuition: studies of
the impacts of ethnic fractionalization in poor countries find that institutions like demo-
cratic governance and contract enforceability can play a decisive role in enabling economic
development (Easterly and Levine, 2001; Collier, 2000). It should be noted that these
studies consider ethnicity, not birth country; they also take as their focus poor countries
in Africa, not American cities. Still, their results suggest that institutions ought to shape
the impacts of immigrant diversity.
It is also worth noting that development economists examining institutions at the
national scale operationalize these forces largely using measures of formal laws regarding
contracts and intellectual property. Such formal legal structures tend to be determined at
the national level, but theorists’ conception of institutions is expansive, equally featuring
informal norms and shared attitudes. This is especially important when studying the
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subnational scale, where even within a larger national context of formal laws, one might
expect considerable local variation. Despite their informality, a great deal of theory and
evidence point to the crucial role these play in shaping the nature of market transactions
and thus local development trajectories (Storper, 1995; Rodŕıguez-Pose, 1999; Morgan,
2007; Storper et al., 2015). Furthermore, though most formal legal institutions apply
nationally, as will be discussed in detail later in this study, there can also be substantial
subnational variation in legal ordinances that shapes local institutional contexts. Thus,
between the formal laws and informal norms and attitudes, we might expect substantial
local variation in the inclusiveness of institutions.
Motivated by these arguments, this paper tests the following primary hypothesis: the
effects of immigrant diversity on worker productivity should be stronger in metropolitan
locations that feature more inclusive institutions.
Additionally, we conjecture that immigrants to the U.S. may be more open to interac-
tions with others than natives (especially in locations that contain large numbers of natives
who may not be particularly welcoming to their presence), rendering their effective trans-
action costs systematically lower than that manifested by native residents. By the very
act of choosing to emigrate to the U.S., immigrants demonstrate at least some openness to
the different culture present in their host country, relative to natives who have remained
in their country of birth. Because natives remain a considerable majority in most urban
locations, we consider that overall measures of local institutions may inadequately capture
immigrants’ attitudes towards transacting with others. Based on this idea, we also explore
whether the relationship between immigrant diversity and wages is more strongly shaped
by the institutional context for native-born workers than for immigrants.
Only two known studies address closely related topics at a subnational scale. Alesina
and La Ferrara (2005) measure the relationships between ethnic diversity and population
growth in U.S. counties, proxying for institutions using local income levels. They find that
poor, ethnically heterogeneous counties tend to experience declines in population, whereas
in wealthy, diverse locales, this relationship is weaker, and in some models, it turns positive.
This suggests a positive role for stronger institutions in modulating the effects of diversity
on local economies, a finding broadly consistent with the primary hypothesis of the present
paper. The closest study to the current paper is Kemeny (2012), which demonstrates that
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the association between birthplace diversity and wages is considerably larger in cities
endowed with higher levels of generalized trust and social capital. While suggestive, that
paper does not account for a large range of potentially relevant but unobserved factors that
distinguish locales, establishments, and individuals; moreover it is largely cross-sectional,
and as such is less able to capture how diversity and wages co-move, which studies like
Longhi (2013) have shown to be critical.
3 Empirical Approach
This section describes the approach taken to measuring the relationship between diversity
and productivity. In relation to the literature described in the previous section, a number
of features are especially important. First, our approach aims to account for a wide range
of hard-to-observe and potentially confounding features of individuals, establishments and
cities. Second, it facilitates observation of the co-movement of diversity and productivity
over time. Third, it distinguishes between potential diversity impacts arising from the city
scale and the workplace scale.
Our aim is to measure how individual workers’ productivity respond to changes in
the diversity that surrounds them. Following much of the existing literature, we proxy
for productivity using information on worker wages, a choice premised on practical but
defensible grounds. Though the two are unlikely to be identical, studies like Combes
et al. (2005) argue that rising productivity is likely to be expressed in higher wages.
Meanwhile, recent work indicates that establishment level productivity and wages exhibit
similar elasticities with respect to city size (Combes et al., 2010).
We focus attention on the work spells of ‘stayers’ – individuals that remain in a single
workplace (and thus metropolitan area) for at least two years. As these workers are fixed
in place, variation comes from the panel structure of our data, and more specifically from
the shifts around these workers in the birthplace composition of the cities in which they
live, and the establishments in which they work. We estimate the following equation:






jt + µipj + ηt + νipjt (1)
where, ln(w) represents the log annual wages of an individual worker i in establishment
p located in metropolitan area j at time t; djt, a key independent variable of interest,
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measures city-specific immigrant diversity; dpjt measures diversity at the level of the es-
tablishment; X ′ represents time-varying measures of worker-specific characteristics;4 E′
describes a vector of dynamic employer characteristics; and C ′ indicates time-varying char-
acteristics of a worker’s metropolitan area. The fixed effect, µipj , represents a key feature
of our approach. Because we analyze only stayers, Equation (1) accounts for the effects
of unobserved permanent characteristics of not just the individual workers themselves,
but also the establishments where they work, and the regional economies in which they
live. At the individual level, such pertinent stationary unobserved heterogeneity could
be present as a consequence of differences in workers’ innate ability, intelligence, or mo-
tivation. Material establishment-specific features could include deep-rooted differences in
capital intensiveness or product quality. And at the level of metropolitan regions, dif-
ferences in specialization, agglomeration, and other factors could be relevant, if hard to
observe and relatively non-dynamic. Returning to Equation (1), ηt represents unobserved
time-specific shocks that exert uniform impacts across all individuals, such as as business
cycles; and νipjt is the standard error term. Applying the fixed effects estimator, Equation
(1) explores how an individual’s productivity responds to changes in the level of immigrant
diversity present in her metropolitan area, while it accounts for major sources of spurious
correlation that might bias estimates of the impact of diversity on wages that rely only on
observable features.
One challenge in measuring the relationship of interest comes from recent work in
urban economics on spatial equilibrium. Following arguments rooted in Roback (1982), in
a system of cities where firms and workers are relatively free to choose locations, estimates
of Equation (1) that demonstrate a positive and significant relationship between wages and
diversity would be unable to distinguish between two interpretations: (a) that diversity
generates spillovers that augment productivity, or (b) that workers consider diversity to
be an unpleasant disamenity, and require higher pay to endure it. The standard remedy is
to relate diversity not just to wages but also to rents. Higher wages and rents in response
to diversity shocks would then be interpreted as confirming (a), whereas results indicating
higher wages and lower rents corresponds to (b).
4Of which, in practice, we have none since the individual charateristics available in the LEHD data –
such as sex, race, and birth year – are time-invariant.
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Our data does not permit us to observe workers’ living arrangements. Nonetheless, we
believe our chosen approach can shed light on diversity’s potential productivity impacts.
Responding narrowly to spatial equilibrium concerns, Moretti (2004a) and Acemoglu and
Angrist (2001) point out that, in areas where firms sell goods and services beyond their im-
mediate locality, higher nominal wages must indicate higher average worker productivity.
While firms in nontradable activities may reference local prices, traded-goods firms face
national prices. If they paid higher wages with no compensating productivity advantages,
firms would be forced to relocate to locations offering some form of compensating differ-
ential – whether in the form of cheaper land or higher quality-of-life. Hence, detecting a
positive relationship between diversity and wages ought to indicate productivity benefits
in regions containing tradable activities. More broadly, while worker mobility, land mar-
kets and consumption are clearly important and interlinked features of urban systems, it
remains far from clear that these features relate in the specific ways that canonical spatial
equilibrium models suggest. Strong questions have been raised about the sequencing of
these models (Storper and Scott, 2009), as well as about the lack of evidence supporting
their most basic prediction: a gradual movement toward utility equalization across cities
in the US urban system (Kemeny and Storper, 2012). In short, it is far from clear that
reality sufficiently conforms to this body of theory, and there is good reason to believe
that rising wages ought to signal productivity growth.
To determine whether or not the relationship between immigrant diversity and pro-
ductivity depends on the inclusiveness of local institutions, we estimate Equation (1)
separately for workers inhabiting cities that feature institutions that are distinctly in-
clusive or exclusive. Because of institutions’ capacity to regulate transaction costs, we
expect that the relationship between diversity and wages ought to be more strongly pos-
itive for workers inhabiting cities with more inclusive institutions. For workers in cities
with exclusive institutions, we expect the relationship to be weaker, nonexistent, or even
negative. To determine if institutions play more of a role in shaping native-born than
immigrants’ diversity-productivity relationship, we estimate Equation (1) separately for
immigrants and native born workers in both inclusive and exclusive instution cities. We
expect the difference between the institutional contexts to be greater for natives than im-
migrants. The next section describes our data, analytical sample, and the construction of
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our measures of diversity and institutional inclusivity.
4 Data
Our primary data source is the U.S. Census Bureau’s confidential Longitudinal Employer-
Household Dynamics (LEHD) Infrastructure files, the sole source of matched employer-
employee data for the United States. The LEHD program integrates administrative records
from state-specific unemployment insurance (UI) programs with Census Bureau economic
and demographic data, providing a nearly universal picture of jobs in the U.S. (McKinney
and Vilhuber, 2011). The version of the data available for this study covers over 90 percent
of all workers in 29 states, on a quarterly basis starting as early as 1991 and continuing
though 2008.5
4.1 Analytical Sample
To estimate the relationship between immigrant diversity and a worker’s wages, we must
first assign workers to workplaces, and thereby to Metropolitan Core-Based Statistical
Areas (CBSAs).6 This assignment serves a few purposes. It permits construction of
diversity measures for each workplace and city. It is also required to help determine which
workers to include in the analytical sample.
Assigning workers to establishments in the LEHD data is a nontrivial task. For work-
ers in jobs at single-unit firms – those with only one plant, outlet, or office – knowing the
employer tells you the place of work, because there is only one possible location. However,
for workers employed at multi-unit firms, knowing the employer cannot definitively reveal
the place of work. About 30-40 percent of workers included in the LEHD data work at
multi-unit firms (McKinney and Vilhuber, 2011). The LEHD includes a file (U2W) that,
for each person employed in a multi-unit firm, provides ten work-unit imputations. Impu-
tations are based on the distance between workers’ homes and establishment locations, and
the distribution of employment across the establishments within the multi-unit employer,
leveraging non-imputed establishment–worker data available for the state of Minnesota
5States used in our project: AR, CA, CO, FL, GA, HI, IA, ID, IL, IN, LA, MD, ME, MT, NC, NJ,
NM, NV, OK, OR, SC, TN, TX, UT, VA, VT, WA, WI, WV.
6CBSAs reflect economically-integrated urban regions. Throughout, we use the terms ‘city’, ‘metropoli-
tan area’, and ‘region’ interchangeably.
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to generalize to the remainder of states (McKinney and Vilhuber, 2011, see Chapter 9).
Because of the number of observations and because work location structures much of the
data processing necessary for our analytical strategy, estimation with multiple imputations
is impractical. Instead, for each job in a multi-unit employer, we assign each worker to
their most frequently imputed establishment, and in the case of ties, random assignment
between the tied modal units.7
Having assigned all workers to establishments across time, we can then identify work
spells upon which to estimate Equation (1). For each worker in LEHD, we include a
maximum of one work spell across our study period. We select the longest such spell,
as long as it exceeds two consecutive calendar years. This two year minimum allows
us to smooth quarterly earnings to an annual measure and observe potential changes in
wages over time. Workers with no spells lasting at least two years are excluded from our
analytical sample (but not our measures of diversity).
We aggregate from quarters to years, and link workers to worker and workplace charac-
teristics available as part of LEHD. Establishment features include location, total annual
employment, and six-digit NAICS industry. Worker characteristics include wages, country
of birth, birth year, sex, and race. Following common practice, for the purpose of analysis
we limit the age range of workers to be over 16 and less than 66 years old. We exclude
workers with very low wages – those below the 5th percentile of the wage distribution –
on the basis that LEHD’s inclusion of all workers earning at least one dollar in a quarter
captures some very low earners potentially operating under irregular employment situa-
tions. We believe that the inclusion of these extremely low earners could reduce the signal
to noise ratio in the relationship of interest. We also drop workers who are simultaneously
employed in multiple jobs, so that we can clearly identify the source of any establishment-
specific diversity effects. Finally, to ensure that our measure of workplace diversity is
7The vast majority of all jobs can only be assigned to a single city, either because they occur in single-
unit employers or multi-unit employers where all the establishments are located in the same city. This raises
our confidence that our diversity measures capture workers who actually work in each city. Furthermore,
we have no reason to believe that there would be any non-random error related to birthplace that would
systematically bias our diversity measures. We test the quality of our assignment process in two ways.
First we relate our measure of metropolitan birthplace diversity to one derived using 5% public-use Census
extracts, with typical correlation coefficients around 0.9. Second, we compare estimates of Equation (1)
generated from our full sample to those derived from a sample limited to workers in single-unit firms only,
where there can be no misattribution of workers to workplaces. Doing so, we find broad consistency across
measures of diversity, in terms of signs, significance, and magnitudes. These checks indicate that any
misattribution from our assignment procedure is not materially affecting our findings.
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informative, we restrict the sample to jobs at establishments with at least ten employees.
Though the resulting sample is very large, our choices imply some limits to gener-
alizability. We cannot describe the relationship of interest for workers with extremely
tenuous labor market attachment (those without any two year UI-recorded job spell),
very low wages, those working in very small establishments, and of course, those who are
self-employed. Given the focus on metropolitan areas, the sample also has no purchase
on the shape of this relationship in rural towns and small municipalities. Finally, our
sample is not perfectly nationally representative, since the version of the LEHD data we
had access to excludes two fifths of the states. However, the states that are represented in
the sample vary along a number of important dimensions that reflect the larger national
system of cities. They are large and small; populous and relatively uninhabited; drawn
from every region of the country; home to longstanding gateway cities and nontraditional
hosts to immigration. We believe that this offers a wide snapshot of workers in American
cities.
4.2 Measuring Diversity
Researchers commonly measure birthplace diversity using the following index of ‘fraction-
alization’:




where s is the proportion of residents in city j who were born in country r ; and R is
the number of different countries represented among residents of that city. The index
nears zero as diversity decreases and its maximum value approaches one as heterogeneity
increases; it is often described as measuring the probability that two randomly-drawn
individuals in a location were born in different countries. This index has been used to
capture a wide variety of categorical forms of diversity, including language, birthplace,
race and ethnicity (see, for example, Taylor and Hudson, 1972; Easterly and Levine, 1997;
Knack and Keefer, 1997; Ottaviano and Peri, 2006; Sparber, 2010). The pervasiveness of
this measure in diversity research is no doubt related to its simplicity, as well as its ability
to capture both the breadth of countries from which individuals originate, as well as the
sizes of these different country groups in a given location.
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Because it is the most widely-used measure in the field, we estimate metropolitan- as
well as establishment-specific levels of diversity using the fractionalization index, using the
universe of LEHD-coded worker birthplaces in a metropolitan area or work unit.8
Workers’ birthplaces and locations in workplaces and thus metropolitan areas form the
basic inputs into annual fractionalization indices. To calculate measures of diversity at the
city level, we first narrow our list of CBSAs to those that do not cross state boundaries
with states unavailable to our project. Thus, although jobs located in Newark, NJ are
included in our raw data, we drop them because they are part of the CBSA for New York
City that also includes jobs in New York State and Pennsylvania, to which we do not have
access. We do include CBSAs straddling multiple states to which we do have access, such
as Texarkana in Texas and Arkansas.
Though the metropolitan area is our primary focus in this paper, theory suggests di-
versity within work units can have positive or negative relationships with productivity,
a possibility we would like to control for in our models. Having assigned workers to es-
tablishments, we can also calculate the fractionalization measure for each establishment
in each year. One difference is that instead of weighting each person’s contribution to
birthplace diversity evenly (as we do in the city measures), we weight each person’s con-
tribution depending on how many quarters they work in a particular establishment. If
they worked half the year in one establishment and half the year in another, then they
count as half a person in the diversity measures of each establishment for that year.
4.3 Measuring Inclusive Institutions
This paper assumes that there are regularities in the level of transaction costs in different
cities, and that these regularities are a function of what Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) call
‘inclusive institutions’. We build two distinctive indicators: a composite measure of social
capital, and a variable that captures locality-specific ordinances aimed at immigrants.
8Kemeny and Cooke (2015) demonstrate that estimates of the relationship between diversity and wages
are not strongly dependent on choosing the standard fractionalization measure, as against an entropy
index, decompositions of the fractionalization measure in the manner of Alesina et al. (2013), or measures
that distinguish the simple share of foreign born from the range of countries present.
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4.3.1 Social Capital
We follow Woolcock and Narayan (2000) in defining social capital as “the norms and net-
works that enable people to act collectively” (p.226). Putnam (2000) famously unpacks
this idea into two categories: bonding, which captures such norms and networks within
groups of similar individuals in a community; and bridging, which indicates these capaci-
ties among members of disparate groups. As Malecki (2012) argues, we can expect social
capital to vary at the regional or metropolitan scale in ways that affect trajectories of
economic development. In the context of this paper, our interest is in its potential moder-
ating role: locations with stronger manifestations of social capital ought to better enable
people born in different countries to act collectively at a lower cost, and in so doing, they
will reap greater rewards from a given quantity of immigrant diversity.
Combining secondary data from various sources, we construct a composite indicator
of social capital, adapting an approach proposed by Rupasingha and Goetz (2008). To
capture aspects of bonding social capital, we use data from County Business Patterns to
count the number of various kinds of associations, including social, advocacy, business,
professional, labor, and political organizations. To ensure comparability across cities of
various size, these counts are scaled per ten thousand residents. We complement these
with an analogous count measure of what Oldenburg (1989) describes as ‘third places’
(the home being the first, and workplace being the second) that can enable both bonding
and bridging forms of social capital. Again relying on County Business Patterns, the
third places we consider include speciality food shops, restaurants, cafés, bars, hair salons,
corner stores, golf clubs, fitness centers, bowling alleys, and sports clubs. To describe civic
participation, we use two pieces of information drawn from Rupasingha and Goetz (2008):
county-level mail response rates for the 2005 American Community Survey (ACS); and
county voter turnout for the 2004 presidential election.
We perform principal components factor analysis, seeking to generate a compound
measure on which to split the sample. The inputs cohere into a single factor with an
eigenvalue of 2.36, explaining 59 percent of the overall variance. Prior to varimax rotation,
the next largest factor has an eigenvalue of 0.67, and is not retained post hoc. Factor
loadings, showing the correlation of each input variable and the resulting composite factor,
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are shown in Table 1. The table also shows that each of the inputs offer something distinct
in the definition of the larger factor, though voter turnout is the least unique.
[Table 1 about here.]
Though it would be possible to build a measure of social capital that varies over time,
we elect to build a single indicator for each metropolitan area, centered on the year 2007,
on the basis that we expect social capital to be highly stable across time.9 We check this
assumption by comparing a version of our index for 2007 to indicators built by Rupasingha
and Goetz for 1990, 2000 and 2005.10 These city-level correlations between measures of
social capital across time are extremely strong: the weakest relationship is between 2007
and 1990 (0.90); the strongest is between 2007 and 2005, with a coefficient of 0.94. This
intertemporal consistency validates our use of an indicator of metropolitan social capital
measured at a single point in our study period.
Seeking to provide a stark contrast between cities that feature inclusive institutions
and those that do not, for our analysis we select the cities that fall into the lowest and
highest terciles of this social capital measure. Here, we interpret cities that scored in the
lowest tercile of social capital as offering the least inclusive institutions, whereas those
cities in the highest tercile feature institutions that are highly inclusive. To illustrate with
concrete examples, Table 2 lists the ten CBSAs that have the highest and lowest values
of our social capital index.
[Table 2 about here.]
4.3.2 Pro- and Anti-Immigrant Ordinances
The second measure of inclusive institutions makes use of data describing local government
policies that either restrict or enable the behavior of immigrants. Since the early 2000s,
municipal governments in the U.S. have increasingly considered and enacted laws that
9In fact, some researchers assert that American social capital is in decline (cf. Putnam, 2000; Rahn and
Transue, 1998; Stolle and Hooghe, 2005). To the extent that this is occurring, it is undoubtedly happening
very slowly, and there is little to suggest it has proceeded idiosyncratically from one city to another.
10To maximize comparability, for this exercise we construct a version of our index that directly mirrors
Rupasingha and Goetz’s measure, in which we include a narrower range of types of third places – however,
the social capital measure we ultimately use in our analysis is closely related.
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target immigrants, a shift that may be best understood as an outgrowth of grassroots re-
sponses to residents’ perceptions of immigrants, and especially undocumented immigrants
(Varsanyi, 2008; Walker and Leitner, 2011). Immigrant-penalizing laws include those seek-
ing to punish employers who hire undocumented immigrants, ones that amend housing
codes to restrict crowding, some that restrict the use of languages other than English, and
still others that require immigration checks in response to events ranging from arrests to
new firm births (Rodriguez, 2008). Meanwhile, other locations have used legislation to
more actively welcome immigrants, enacting ‘sanctuary’ laws that prohibit immigration
checks or regulations that extend voting rights for immigrants in local elections (Walker
and Leitner, 2011).
Although these ordinances are formally aimed at regulating undocumented immigrants,
evidence suggests that they affect the wider foreign-born population, regardless of the
status of their documentation, in that those who look and sound different will live in a
context marked by real risks from police and other residents engaged in profiling (see for
example, Nguyen and Gill, 2015). Nonetheless, our primary interest is not in how these
ordinances may or may not have a direct legal effect on individuals. It lies instead in their
utility as an indicator of local attitudes towards immigrants, reflecting priorities to publicly
debate and potentially adopt an official stance on the presence of immigrants. We take pro-
immigrant ordinances as signals of an inclusive institutional context, whereby lawmakers
and community members felt the need to enact legislation that aims to foster greater
integration and inclusivity towards those born abroad. By contrast, we interpret the
presence of anti-immigrant ordinances to signal a community’s strong reluctance towards
bridging behavior with immigrants specifically. One important difference between these
measures and our social capital index is that the ordinance-based measures capture not
just general inclusiveness, but more precisely they gauge inclusiveness towards individuals
born in foreign countries.
The ordinance measures used here start from a bespoke national dataset assembled by
Walker and Leitner (2011). These data are locality-specific, covering 369 individual ordi-
nances proposed or implemented as last as February 2009. Ordinances emerge from both
municipalities and counties, and have been coded as either “pro-” or “anti-immigrant.” We
aggregate pro- or anti-immigrant ordinances to the metropolitan scale, weighting by pop-
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ulation in the process. Since metropolitan areas frequently include several municipalities
and often multiple counties, not all of which have passed immigrant-related ordinances, the
resulting metropolitan-level indices have uneven coverage. Some CBSAs have laws cover-
ing only a very limited share of the total population. Other areas contain a patchwork of
places that variously offer pro- and anti-immigrant ordinances. Seeking to maximize the
signal to noise ratio, we classify CBSAs as being pro-immigrant only when more than 50
percent of their population is covered by pro-immigrant laws. We use the same thresh-
old to classify cities as anti-immigrant. This means we discard a host of metropolitan
areas that either have no ordinances at all, have some which cover modest proportions
of total residents, or are subject to an inconclusive mix of pro- and anti-immigrant laws.
While this entails estimating our model on a restricted subset of cities, we view this as
an acceptable tradeoff in that it ensures that we have captured truly distinct institutional
features. Simply, we want to make sure that pro-immigrant metros are truly different from
anti-immigrant metros, and to do so we need to eliminate ambiguous cases.
[Table 3 about here.]
As with our measure of social capital, we generate only one ordinance measure per
metropolitan area, ignoring the time dimension in our primary data. We do so for sub-
stantive reasons. The passage of these laws cannot be seen as exogenous shocks acting on
our outcome; they are instead manifestations of deeply-held community attitudes regulat-
ing interpersonal interaction. We consider that these attitudes ought to be relatively static
across our study period, such that, even if an ordinance is passed in 2005, the sentiments
and beliefs that give rise to it should still be latent in the community in earlier periods,
at least in medium run.
For descriptive purposes, Table 3 reports the ten metropolitan areas that are most
clearly pro- and anti-immigrant, based on the proportion of each region’s population un-
ambiguously covered by ordinances of a certain character. Cities with the widest coverage
from pro-immigrant ordinances make up a diverse mix, including university towns (Madi-
son); politically-liberal metropolises (San Jose), and smaller agricultural regions (Fresno).
Locations with wide coverage from local anti-immigrant laws include larger Sunbelt regions
(Houston and Charlotte), as well as smaller cities in the Rustbelt (Green Bay; Appleton).
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4.4 Control Variables
As section 4.2 makes clear, LEHD is very rich in terms of capturing nearly the full breadth
of the workforce in great temporal detail. But it captures only a modest range of features
of those individuals and their workforces, and our empirical strategy takes best advan-
tage of both these strengths and weaknesses. Specifically, the inclusion of individual x
workplace x city fixed effects means that unobserved factors at each of these levels – of
which there could be many – ought not to bias our estimates of the relationship of in-
terest, as long as those factors are relatively stationary. Additionally, we seek to include
as many relevant time-varying control variables as possible. To capture changes in inter-
nal economies of scale, we include a measure of workplace-specific annual employment,
drawn from LEHD. Owing to the absence of time-varying measures of individual worker
characteristics in LEHD, the vector X ′ipjt is omitted from our actual estimating equation.
At the metropolitan scale, we control for external economies of scale using a measure of
overall city employment. We also seek to control for local educational spillovers using
a CBSA-specific indicator of average educational attainment. To build this measure, we
avoid using LEHD’s individual-level imputed educational length indicator because, when
aggregated to the metropolitan scale, imputed values are only weakly correlated with com-
parable non-imputed measures derived from 5 percent extracts of the Decennial Census.
Instead, as in Moretti (2004b), we estimate the annual share of each CBSA’s workforce
holding at least a 4-year college degree, using 5% public-use IPUMS extracts from the
1990 and 2000 Decennial Censuses, as well as 1% samples from each year of the 2001–2008
ACS (Ruggles et al., 2010), interpolating between available years of data. Incomplete
coverage of metropolitan areas in IPUMS reduces our sample of CBSAs from 232 to 163.
The poor quality of the imputed LEHD education data also means we can not directly
observe shocks to human capital in individual establishments. To the extent that such
shocks might be correlated with shifts in immigrant diversity in the workplace, causal
interpretation becomes more challenging at that scale.
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4.5 Summary Statistics
Table 4 presents descriptive statistics for key variables in our analytical sample, as well
as salient static characteristics of the workforce, included in order to compare the overall
sample to the larger US working population. The dependent variable throughout our
analysis is the log of an individual worker’s annual earnings, which in LEHD are drawn
from Unemployment Insurance records. The average worker in our sample earns a little
over $35,000 annually, and is 40 years old. Sixty-seven percent of the sample is white, 84
percent is native-born, and 47 percent is female. These characteristics broadly reflect the
overall U.S. economy (Lee and Mather, 2008; Social Security Administration, 2015). The
average work spell in the sample lasts nearly 5 years.
[Table 4 about here.]
5 Results
This section presents estimates of the main relationship of interest: whether and how local
institutions moderate the relationship between immigrant diversity and worker productiv-
ity. In each of the estimates that follow, we cluster standard errors at the establishment
level, reasoning that workers’ wages will be more strongly conditioned by sharing a com-
mon workplace than by simple co-presence within a particular metropolitan area.
5.1 Main Estimates of the Moderating Role of Institutions
Although the main contrast to be drawn is between workers who live in cities that have
strongly and weakly inclusive institutions, for comparison purposes, we begin in the first
column of Table 5 by presenting estimates for all workers in all cities in our analytical
sample. In keeping with the prior studies reviewed in Section 2, results indicate that city
diversity is positively and significantly related to wages. The other city-level covariates
have the expected signs, showing evidence of externalities arising from human capital and
scale. At the establishment level, diversity is positively related to wages, at a one percent
level of significance. Workplace employment is also positive and significant, suggesting the
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presence of internal economies of scale.11
[Table 5 about here.]
In Columns 2 and 3 we report on our use of the social capital indicator to differenti-
ate workers on the basis of the inclusiveness of their metropolitan institutional contexts.
Workers in Column 2 live in cities that fall within the lowest tercile of social capital.
Those in Column 3 live in cities in the highest tercile of social capital. Our main interest
is the contrast between coefficients on our measure of urban immigrant diversity across
these two groups. Though the estimated coefficient for city-level diversity is positive and
significantly related to the wages of workers in both kinds of cities, the strength of the
association varies considerably: the coefficient on metropolitan immigrant diversity for
workers in cities in the highest tercile of social capital is seven times as high as for workers
in the lowest.12
The fourth and fifth columns of results in Table 5 present estimates in which we cap-
ture variation in the inclusiveness of institutions using our measures of local immigrant
ordinances. Column 4 presents estimates on the sample of workers residing in cities where
at least 50 percent of the population is covered by anti-immigrant ordinances. The coeffi-
cient on city-level immigrant diversity is statistically insignificant. Column 5 shows results
for workers in cities with at least 50 percent of the population covered by pro-immigrant
ordinances. The coefficient for city level diversity is positive, significant and large. These
results are broadly consistent with those found using the social capital indicator, though
even more strongly differentiated. A logic for this larger gap is easily obtained: metropoli-
tan areas in which a large subset of the population is covered by pro-immigrant ordinances
have acted decisively to welcome immigrant in their midst. Whereas those marked by anti-
immigrant laws are not simply weaker in terms of bridging – they have actively made their
environment hostile to immigrants. This more pronounced gap in the spread of our ordi-
11Results in the first column of Table 5 are drawn from Kemeny and Cooke (2015). That paper demon-
strates that this general relationship is robust to a wide range of measures of birthplace diversity; different
subsamples; the inclusion of various control variables, including those measuring age and racial fractional-
ization, Bartik-style local demand shocks, and immigrant-specific measures of educational attainment.
12Our measures of institutions capture a phenomenon that is distinct from city size. Running models
only on workers inhabiting cities above a threshold of one million residents, we found that, for workers in
low social capital cities, the coefficient on city diversity is positive but not statistically significant at a 10
percent level, while the city diversity coefficient for workers in cities with high levels of social capital was
very large and statistically significant at a one percent level.
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nance measure is reflected in its more pronounced moderation of the relationship between
diversity and wages.
5.2 Estimates of the Moderating Role of Institutions by Nativity
Next we unpack the relationship of interest by nativity. That is, we estimate how native-
and foreign-born workers may be differently rewarded from the diversity in their midst on
the basis of the institutions present in their local environment. It seems most plausible
to expect variation of this kind for our ordinance measure: although pro- and especially
anti-immigrant ordinances may reflect the attitudes of certain constituencies in the the
native-born population, there far less reason to expect that they extend to immigrants
themselves. Though they may reside in a hostile environment, immigrants may not share
this xenophobia, and may indeed face quite low barriers to cross-cultural interaction.
[Table 6 about here.]
Table 6 explores this idea, estimating Equation (1) in pro- and anti-immigrant ordi-
nance cities separately for native and foreign-born workers. The first and second columns
of results present estimates for cities with anti-immigrant ordinances. For foreign-born
workers in these anti-immigrant locales (Column 1), the coefficient on metropolitan immi-
grant diversity is positive and significant at a one percent level. Interestingly, for natives
in these cities (Column 2), we detect no significant relationship between diversity and
wages. This suggests that the very natives who have enacted exclusive institutions are
locked out of the benefits associated with immigrant diversity. Columns 3 and 4 present
results by nativity for workers in cities featuring pro-immigrant ordinances. In these cities,
for native- and foreign-born workers alike, the coefficient on birthplace diversity is large,
positive and significant at a one percent level. Thus, as well as comparing the average
results across city types, it is interesting to consider how natives and foreigners fare with
respect to diversity depending on where they live. Though foreigners in general may face
lower transaction costs in interacting with people from different countries, spillovers from
diversity are considerably higher in cities that feature pro-immigrant ordinances.
Though the clearest rationale for focusing on nativity comes from our ordinance mea-
sure, to support our results the next four columns repeat the process for our social capital
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measure. For workers in cities in the lowest tercile of social capital, Columns 5 and 6
present estimates for foreign- and native-born, respectively. Mirroring the pattern shown
for the ordinance measures, foreign-born workers continue to receive wage benefits from
urban diversity in cities with low social capital, whereas for natives there is no significant
association between rising metropolitan birthplace diversity and wages. In cities with high
levels of social capital (columns 7 and 8), both native and foreign-born workers enjoy con-
siderably large urban diversity spillovers, significant at a one percent level. While these
nativity-specific results offer insights into the distribution of any benefits arising from di-
versity, they are of particular interest in the present paper since they offer further support
for institutions in moderating the relationship between diversity and productivity.
5.3 Instrumental Variables Estimates
Although our overall estimation approach accounts for a breadth of static unobserved
factors, as well as systemwide dynamics like business cycles, estimates of Equation (1)
remain vulnerable to shocks to individuals, workplaces, and cities that affect wages. To
the extent that such idiosyncratic shocks are correlated with shifts in diversity, we may
be attributing to diversity an effect that resides instead with these factors. For instance,
workplaces that experience a rise in diversity may simultaneously invest in machinery
that makes workers more productive. Without indicators to capture such investments,
our estimates of the role of diversity in generating spillovers may be biased. The use of
instrumental variables is no panacea, though with plausibly exogenous and sufficiently
strong instruments, it supports more confident statements about the causal nature of the
relationships at hand.
With this in mind, in Table 7 we present Generalized Method of Moments fixed effects
(GMM FE) estimates of the relationship of interest for workers in cities that fall into the
lowest and highest terciles of our social capital measure. We instrument for current-year
diversity using deeper lags of city and workplace diversity. We opt for such ‘internal’ instru-
ments mainly due to a lack of availability of external candidate instruments, particularly
at the establishment scale.13 We performed extensive tests of the exclusion restriction on a
13We experimented with several external instruments for city immigrant diversity, including a longi-
tudinal version of the shift-share ‘predicted diversity’ instrument that is widely used in (primarily cross
sectional) studies of immigration and immigrant diversity (see, for instance, Card, 2001; Ottaviano and
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broad range of lags before finding candidates that did not emerge as significant predictors
of the outcomes of interest, but which also permitted overidentification. We ultimately
settled on three to five year lags for city diversity, and a two or four year lag for estab-
lishment diversity. The Kleibergen-Paap F -statistic, appropriate given no assumption of
independent and identically-distributed errors, shows these instruments not to be weak,
while results from the Hansen-J test indicate joint exogeneity.
[Table 7 about here.]
As before, our primary interest is in the contrast between the coefficients on metropoli-
tan immigrant diversity on the basis of the strength of local social capital. For those
workers in cities in the bottom tercile of social capital (column 1), we report that urban
immigrant diversity is unrelated to wages. In column 2, for workers in cities with the high-
est social capital, the coefficient on metropolitan immigrant diversity is very large, positive
and significant at a 1 percent level. These results broadly conform to the uninstrumented
results, in terms of showing strong differentiation in the benefits from diversity in favor
of cities that feature inclusive institutions. However they differ in indicating no benefits
for workers in cities with the weakest social capital. Our IV results differ additionally in
that, in the highest tercile of social capital, the coefficient on workplace diversity is both
negative and not significantly related to wages. We interpret this cautiously, noting that
the use of lags entail considerable loss of observations, as well as truncation of the duration
of job spells.
6 Conclusion
This paper set out to answer the following question: do the effects of urban immigrant
diversity on worker productivity depend on the inclusiveness of local institutions? The
rationale for this question is rooted in a growing empirical literature seeking to understand
the links between diversity and productivity. While studies in this area have become more
sophisticated in their empirical approach, the extant work remains relatively distant from
Peri, 2006; Kemeny, 2012), as well as an annual measure capturing the presence of refugees in metropolitan
areas, using information drawn from The Department of State’s Refugee Processing Center. Neither of
these instruments passed tests of instrument under- and overidentification.
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the underlying theory, which sites the mechanisms engendering positive or negative effects
in interpersonal interactions. Since institutions are widely viewed to regulate the costs of
such interactions, it makes sense to exploit variation in such institutions as a way to more
carefully test the underlying theory. More practically, if institutions do indeed make a
difference, findings could highlight the important function of local context. In addition to
a more faithful test of theoretical ideas, this paper adds value to related work by building
and triangulating across two measures of urban institutions, including one that is both
novel and highly germane to this literature; by adopting an approach that accounts for
non-random worker selectivity and a host of other potential threats to internal validity;
and by exploring differential effects on the basis of nativity.
Results confirm our primary hypothesis. The wages of workers in cities that feature
strongly inclusive institutions, whether measured by social capital or immigrant ordi-
nances, respond much more sharply to changes in immigrant diversity in their urban
context. The wages of the average worker inhabiting a city in the lowest tercile of social
capital rise by 2.4 percent in response to a one standard deviation increase in metropolitan
immigrant diversity. The average worker in a city in the highest tercile of social capital
enjoys a 21 percent wage increase in response to a similar increase in diversity. As befits
the sharper distinctions it draws, using our ordinance measure we detect no significant as-
sociation between urban immigrant diversity and wages in cities featuring anti-immigrant
ordinances, whereas the average worker in a metropolitan context featuring pro-immigrant
laws receives a 36 percent wage increase. To put these numbers in context, the average
change in diversity over the study period is approximately half a standard deviation, al-
though immigrant diversity in a good number of metropolitan areas grows by a standard
deviation, while in a handful of cities it expands by two standard deviations. Hence,
although there is considerable variation across cities, the links between immigrant diver-
sity and wages are not only statistically significant, but especially in cities endowed with
inclusive institutions, diversity plays a substantively important role in influencing wages.
We also find evidence to suggest that natives and immigrants experience the moderat-
ing role of institutions differently. Broadly, foreign-born workers are more highly rewarded
from rising diversity, offering support for the idea that they are more open to interacting
with those from different backgrounds. Interestingly, and somewhat ironically, it appears
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that the workers who are most hurt from anti-immigrant ordinances belong to the very
category of workers who are most likely to have supported them: natives. We find no evi-
dence of an association between diversity and productivity for natives in cities with weakly
inclusive institutions. Immigrants enjoy spillovers from immigrant diversity in cities of all
kinds, but the rewards are considerably stronger in cities that have higher levels of social
capital or pro-immigrant ordinances.
In seeking to better measure the relationship of interest, in this paper we adopted
methods able to account for a wide range of threats to internal validity. Despite the careful
empirical strategy, our ability to identify an independent causal relationship remains,
as always, imperfect. One strength of our approach lies in its ability to absorb bias
from relatively stationary factors at the individual, workplace and city scales. However
unmeasured dynamic factors remain a concern. At the city level we account for shocks to
the stock of college-educated workers and agglomeration, while at the workplace scale we
capture changes in plant size. However, to the extent they are correlated with diversity,
shocks to workplaces – such as increases in human capital or investment – could still
inhibit accurate estimation of the relationship of interest. Our IV strategy helps address
such concerns, but it cannot fully eliminate them. In part for this reason, our focus in
this paper has been on the city scale, where we can be more confident of the results.
Mismeasurement of inclusive institutions represents another potential concern. Indicators
of latent variables will always contain measurement error, and this holds true for our social
capital and ordinance indices. A related risk is that these indicators track unobserved
factors unrelated to the underlying concept of interest. We responded to these challenges
by triangulating across estimates produced with very different kinds of measures of the
deeper latent concept. However, it remains possible that unobserved factors drive the
differentiated results we observe. We hope that future studies will be able to more fully
address these concerns, whether by exploiting exogenous shocks to institutions or through
SEM-style models explicitly incorporating measurement error. Studies might also seek to
measure institutions in individual workplaces, to observe how the ideas explored in this
paper play out at that scale. We also reiterate limits on external validity that we imposed
by focusing on firms with at least 10 employees, and by dropping the very lowest-income
workers. There is consequently further work to be done to understand the impacts of
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immigrant diversity for these subpopulations.
Overall, our findings suggest that institutions – those “humanly devised constraints
that structure political, economic and social interaction” (North, 1991) – play an important
role in shaping the conditions in which diversity acts as a local productivity-enhancing
public good. In a broader context in which American cities are becoming increasingly
immigrant-diverse, the present paper suggests that policymakers have an incentive to find
ways to lower the costs that workers born in different countries face in interacting with one
another. Indeed, in cities that feature strongly inclusive institutions, growing immigrant
diversity appears to offer concrete benefits to both natives and immigrants alike.
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Table 1: Factor Loadings: Social Capital Indicator, 2007
Variable Loading Uniqueness
Associations 0.73 0.42
Third Places 0.76 0.46
Census Response Rates 0.73 0.46
Voter Turnout 0.84 0.29
33
Table 2: Strongest and Weakest CBSAs According to their Levels of Social Capital
Highest Social Capital Lowest Social Capital
Appleton, WI McAllen-Edinburg-Mission, TX
Des Moines-West Des Moines, IA Fayetteville, NC
Green Bay, WI Lakeland-Winter Haven, FL
Billings, MT Riverside-San Bernardino-Ontario, CA
Portland-South Portland-Biddeford, ME Bakersfield-Delano, CA
Cedar Rapids, IA Killeen-Temple-Fort Hood, TX
Milwaukee-Waukesha-West Allis, WI El Paso, TX
Eugene-Springfield, OR Houston-Sugar Land-Baytown, TX
Davenport-Moline-Rock Island, IA-IL Fresno, CA
Trenton-Ewing, NJ Beaumont-Port Arthur, TX
Note: Authors’ calculations as described in Section 4.3.1, based on underlying data drawn from County
Business Patterns and other sources.
34
Table 3: Pro- and Anti-Immigrant Ordinances: Top Ten CBSA ranked according to the
proportion of the population covered by ordinances
Widest Pro-Immigrant Coverage Widest Anti-Immigrant Coverage
Madison, WI Charlotte-Concord-Gastonia, NC-SC
Salem, OR Palm Bay-Melbourne-Titusville, FL
Santa Rosa, CA Green Bay, WI
Chicago-Naperville-Elgin, IL-IN-WI Appleton, WI
El Paso, TX Houston-The Woodlands-Sugar Land, TX
Albuquerque, NM Fayetteville-Springdale-Rogers, AR-MO
San Jose-Sunnyvale-Santa Clara, CA Tulsa, OK
Fresno, CA Riverside-San Bernardino-Ontario, CA
Austin-Round Rock, TX Burlington, NC
Santa Fe, NM Harrisonburg, VA
Note: Authors’ calculations as described in Section 4.3.2, based on data from Walker and Leitner (2011).
35
Table 4: Summary Statistics on Full Analytical Sample
Variable Mean Standard Deviation
Individual Characteristics
Log Annual Earnings 10.48 0.637
Age 40.32 11.67
White 0.667 0.471
U.S. Born 0.840 0.366
Female 0.467 0.499
Spell Duration 4.970 3.304
Establishment Characteristics




Birthplace Fractionalization 0.180 0.129
College Share, All Workers 0.256 0.074




All data displayed in this table are drawn from LEHD, except for city college share, which is built from
public-use IPUMS data.
36
Table 5: Fixed Effects Estimates of Relationship between Immigrant Diversity and Log
Annual Wages by Two Measures of Inclusive Institutions
Full Social Capital Immigrant Ordinances
Sample Low High Anti Pro
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
City-Level Measures
Birthplace Fractionalization 0.375∗∗∗ 0.168∗∗ 0.969∗∗∗ 0.099 1.314∗∗∗
(0.065) (0.066) (0.298) (0.098) (0.129)
College Share 0.162∗∗∗ -0.522∗∗∗ 0.093 -0.260∗∗∗ 0.065
(0.040) (0.062) (0.103) (0.062) (0.099)
Employment (milions) 0.031∗∗∗ 0.027∗∗∗ 0.096∗∗∗ 0.037∗∗∗ -0.058∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.006) (0.022) (0.007) (0.018)
Establishment-Level Measures
Birthplace Fractionalization 0.073∗∗∗ 0.051∗∗∗ 0.086∗∗∗ 0.069∗∗∗ 0.087∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.006) (0.024) (0.007) (0.014)
Employment (thousands) 0.006∗ 0.003 0.009∗ 0.001 0.020∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.002) (0.006)
Observations (millions) 166.5 73.67 29.70 41.05 22.67
Individuals (millions) 33.5 15.28 5.48 8.19 4.44
R2 0.95 0.95 0.94 0.95 0.95
Note: Standard errors in parentheses, corrected for clustering by establishment. ∗p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05,
∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Estimated equation is (1). Person-workplace-city effect and year effects included in each








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 7: GMM FE Instrumental Variables Estimates




Birthplace Fractionalization 0.001 1.979∗∗
(0.122) (0.896)
College Share -0.165∗∗ 0.258
(0.067) (0.190)
Employment (millions) 0.012∗ 0.078
(0.007) (0.055)
Establishment-Level Measures
Birthplace Fractionalization 0.092∗∗∗ -0.634
(0.031) (0.396)
Employment (thousands) 0.006∗ -0.0004
(0.003) (0.002)
Observations (millions) 22.27 8.42
Individuals (millions) 4.66 1.56
Kleibergen-Paap first-stage F 1732 76
Hansen J 2.18 0.001
Hansen J p-value 0.14 0.98
Note: Standard errors in parentheses, corrected for clustering by establishment. ∗p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05,
∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Estimated equation is (1). Person-workplace-city effect and year effects included in each
model. Overall observation counts are rounded to the nearest 10,000 to ensure confidentiality.
39
